Pregnancy Leave in Massachusetts: Understanding the Maternity Act

The Massachusetts Maternity Leave (MMLA) experienced a set back with the Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling in Global NAPs v. Awiszus. I had the opportunity to provide my thoughts about the decision to WBZ’s Diane Stern.

As background, the MMLA, which is codified under M.G.L. c. 149, §105D, guarantees “eligible” employees 8 weeks of unpaid leave for: (1) giving birth, (2) adopting a child under the age of 18, or (3) adopting a child under the age of 23, if the child is mentally or physically disabled. To learn more about the MMLA’s eligibility requirements and for a summary of the key differences between the MMLA and the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA), please visit our previous post, Medical Leave Eligibility and Handicap Status in the Workplace Explored.

In Stephens v. Global NAPs, Sandy Stephens worked for Global’s president as a housekeeper. In late 1999, she informed her supervisor of her pregnancy and that her last day of work before maternity leave would be July 14, 2000. Under the MMLA, Ms. Stephens was guaranteed 8 weeks of unpaid maternity leave. Her employer, however, promised her an additional 3 weeks of unpaid leave if she required a Cesarean section, which she did. Unfortunately, when Ms. Stephens tried to return after 11 weeks, Global reneged on its promise and informed her that she no longer had a job. Ms. Stephens brought suit under the MMLA and a jury found against Global for compensatory damages in the amount of $1,366,165 and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000.

The question before the SJC was whether Ms. Stephens could properly state a claim under the MMLA. According to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), the Commonwealth’s chief civil rights agency charged with interpreting and enforcing the law in question, the answer is “yes.” In fact, the MCAD’s Maternity Leave Act Guidelines explicitly address this issue:

An employer may grant a longer maternity leave than required under the MMLA. If the employer does not intend for full MMLA rights to apply to the period beyond eight weeks, however, it must clearly so inform the employee in writing prior to the commencement of the leave.

Although the SJC has previously acknowledged that such guidelines “represent the MCAD’s interpretation … and are entitled to substantial deference,” it abandoned the MCAD’s interpretation of the MMLA. Specifically, despite the employer’s promise that Ms. Stephens could take an extra 3 weeks off, the SJC held that she “was not entitled to the protections afforded by the MMLA, given that she was absent from employment for more than eight weeks.” As the SJC noted, however, the employer’s broken promise may give rise to a claim “for breach of contract, breach of oral representations, detrimental reliance, or the like.” For reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, such claims may be more difficult for an employee to pursue.

In light of the Awiszus decision, employees are well-advised to understand their rights under the MMLA. As the SJC has made clear, relying solely on the word of an employer that promises more maternity leave than the MMLA contemplates may leave you unemployed.

Proving Workplace Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence: A Review Of Thermo King

Claims for unlawful workplace discrimination are typically proven through two types of evidence: direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is often referred to as “smoking gun” evidence where, for example, a company informs an employee that he or she is being terminated because of his or her age. Circumstantial evidence is much more subtle. As a great trial lawyer once said, “We better know there is a fire whence we see much smoke rising than we could know it by one or two witnesses swearing to it. The witnesses may commit perjury, but the smoke cannot.” Abraham Lincoln, Unsent Letter to J.R. Underwood and Henry Grider, October 26, 1864. Thus, in an age discrimination case, circumstantial evidence may take the form of an older employee (who is at least 40 years old) who is terminated without explanation.

This brings us to the case of Vélez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico. There, the employer terminated a 56 year old employee without explanation. The company finally provided a reason for the termination after the employee filed a claim for age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The employer changed its reason thereafter. The First Circuit found the employer’s initial silence to constitute circumstantial evidence of discrimination:

Thermo King did not initially provide Vélez with any reason for firing him. One month later, Soto told the ADU and the EEOC that Vélez had been fired for violating the company’s policy on receiving gifts from suppliers. It was not until over a year later that Thermo King, responding to this lawsuit, first said that Vélez had been fired for stealing and selling company property. The fact that the employer gave different reasons at different times for its action surely supports a finding that the reason it ultimately settled on was fabricated.

In my interview with Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, I discussed the significance of the Thermo King decision:

It appears to be the first time the 1st Circuit has held that an employer’s failure to articulate the reasons for a termination before litigation equals pretext for discrimination.

Our prediction is that the Thermo King decision will encourage more transparency. Employers are now incentivized to articulate a clear reason as to why an employee is being terminated from the outset or risk an inference of discriminatory motive.

Family Rights Discrimination Continues to be a Hot Button Issue

Family rights discrimination (FRD) — discrimination against an employee who serves as a caregiver to a family member — continues to be a hot button issue in the workplace. According to the Center for WorkLife Law (CWL), there were a total of just 8 FRD cases filed in the 1970s. The number significantly increased over the next several years, with a total of 97 FRD cases filed from 1986 to 1995. Unfortunately, FRD has shown little sign of abatement. From 1986 to 2005, FRD filings totaled 481; an increase of approximately 400%.

While smaller businesses present the highest incidence of FRD, large companies — even those recognized by Fortune as “Best Companies to Work For” — have been sued for such discrimination. According to the CWL, the success rate of FRD cases is relatively high, coming in at greater than 50% versus 20% for other types of discrimination cases. Notably, the average award for FRD cases is slightly over $100,000 with a high of $25 million.

Not surprisingly, women are plaintiffs in the overwhelming majority of FRD cases. It is not uncommon for such cases to arise in the context of pregnancy. A recent article featured in Forbes entitled How To Balance Work and Pregnancy, highlights two scenarios of which employees should be mindful:

Be Conscientious
If you do all this and notice your boss is restricting the types of projects you work on or has taken you off the partnership track, address it with him. In the best scenario, the boss is trying to make things easy on you (albeit unfairly). Document all of these changes and then say something to him. In most cases, it’s a misunderstanding that will be rectified by your bringing it to his attention.

Be Wary
If it’s a more serious situation, such as the boss making offhand comments about your pregnancy affecting your work, continue to document those instances. Also keep note of the change in assignments you’re getting. First, go to your boss and ask if there’s a problem with the quality of your work. If it doesn’t improve, bring all the examples to human resources. Discriminating against someone because they’re pregnant is illegal, and most companies will handle the situation immediately.

When in doubt, consult with an attorney who concentrates in employment law. You owe it to yourself, your family, and your career.

Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act Applies to Men

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) recently announced that the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act (MMLA), M.G.L. c. 149, s. 105D, must be viewed as gender neutral. Originally, the MMLA provided female employees with eight weeks of leave relating to the birth or adoption of a child. Recognizing the disparate treatment that the MMLA created, the MCAD Guidelines warned that “an employer who provides leave to female employees only, and not to male employees, may violate the federal prohibitions against sex discrimination even though the employer has acted in compliance with the MMLA” (See Answer 11).

MCAD Commissioner, Martin Ebel, defended the change as not only necessary to ensure equal treatment between male and female employees, but also to guarantee equality between same-sex couples:

If two women are married and adopt a child, then they are both entitled to leave under the [MMLA], and yet if two men are married and adopt a child, they would be entitled to no leave under a strict reading of the statute. That result was troubling to us, and we didn’t think it was in keeping with our mandate by statute, which is to eliminate, eradicate and prevent discrimination in Massachusetts.

The MCAD’s long-awaited stance on the MMLA is a welcome change. Restricting the MMLA to female employees reflects the archaic perception that a woman’s career should take a backseat after giving birth. Granting equal maternity leave benefits to both men and women finally brings the statute into the 21st century.

For more information about the change to the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act, please visit the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly article entitled, Men now eligible for maternity benefits

Gender Discrimination Claim Filed Against Boston Law Firm

One of Boston’s largest defense law firms finds itself in the same position as its clients: defending a lawsuit. In December 2007, Kamee Verdrager filed a gender discrimination and retaliation Charge of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) against Mintz Levin. Ironically, Ms. Verdrager is an associate in Mintz Levin’s employment law department where she defends claims brought against employers.

In her Charge, Ms. Verdrager details the repeated instances of gender bias that she allegedly experienced since the start of her employment in 2004. The Charge names Mintz Levin as a firm and also the following partners on an individual basis: David Barmak, Robert Gault, and Donald Schroeder.

Massachusetts Lawyer’s Weekly reported on this case in an article entitled, Mintz, Levin associate hits firm with MCAD bias complaint. According to the article, Mintz Levin is no stranger to gender discrimination allegations:

In 2005, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a jury had acted permissibly on the evidence in finding that Mintz, Levin’s Reston, Va., office had retaliated against a female employee, attorney Dawn M. Gallina — by deferring a pay increase and ultimately terminating her — because of her continued complaints of gender discrimination.

Given the factual issues at stake and the need for extensive discovery, we expect this case to be pulled out of the MCAD and wind up in Superior Court. To learn more about the MCAD process, please visit our post entitled, Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) Issues Probable Cause Finding in Handicap Discrimination Case.

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) Issues Probable Cause Finding in Handicap Discrimination Case

Last week, I received a Probable Cause finding from the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) in a case involving handicap discrimination.

The decision confirms that, where an employer requests medical documentation from an employee to verify a medical condition and make accommodations, the inquiry must be appropriately focused:

The MCAD Guidelines state than an employer may request medical documentation to determine the existence of a disability and identify effective accommodations. However, the guidelines also that the inquiry must be appropriately focused. In the instant case, the Respondent’s inquiries were not appropriately focused. The Respondent allowed a line supervisor to determine that an accommodation was to be denied. The Respondent then engaged in a protracted and obtuse series of inquiries by various individuals who lacked the knowledge or authority to determine what if any accommodation was needed.

Click here for the full decision.

The MCAD Process has multiple stages. First, a Charge of Discrimination must be filed within 300 days from the date the discrimination occurred. In response to the charges, the employer submits its Position Statement. The complainant next submits his or her Rebuttal in the final stage of the pleadings. Once all pleadings are submitted, the MCAD conducts its investigation and determines whether Probable Cause for discrimination exists.

The Probable Cause finding means that the MCAD has found sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that unlawful discrimination may have occurred. The case then proceeds to a conciliation conference where efforts at resolution between the Complainant and the Respondent are attempted. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, the case goes to Public Hearing.

MCAD Issues Probable Cause Finding in Handicap Discrimination Case

Last week, I received a Probable Cause finding from the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in a case involving handicap discrimination.

The decision confirms that, where an employer requests medical documentation from an employee, the inquiry must be appropriately focused:

The MCAD Guidelines state than an employer may request medical documentation to determine the existence of a disability and identify effective accommodations. However, the guidelines also that the inquiry must be appropriately focused. In the instant case, the Respondent’s inquiries were not appropriately focused. The Respondent allowed a line supervisor to determine than an accommodation was to be denied. The Respondent then engaged in a protracted and obtuse series of inquiries by various individuals who lacked the knowledge or authority to determine what if any accommodation was needed.

The MCAD Process has multiple stages. First, a Charge of Discrimination must be filed within 300 days from the date the discrimination occurred. In response to the charges, the employer submits its Position Statement. The complainant next submits his or her Rebuttal in the final stage of the pleadings. Once all pleadings are submitted, the MCAD conducts its investigation and determines whether Probable Cause for discrimination exists.

The Probable Cause finding means that the MCAD has found sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that unlawful discrimination may have occurred. The case then proceeds to a conciliation conference where efforts at resolution between the Complainant and the
Respondent are attempted. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, the case goes to Public Hearing.

Massachusetts CORI Reform to Broaden MCAD’s Police Power

Massachusetts’ Criminal Offender Record Information laws should expect an overhaul in 2008. Among Governor Deval Patrick’s initiatives is a push to assist individuals with criminal records with finding jobs and preventing workplace discrimination. The Massachusetts Bar Association (MBA) has been particularly outspoken about the need for CORI reform. Current MBA President, David White, discussed the hidden job discrimination with which this group must contend in his President’s Message entitled, Criminal reforms are long overdue.

Under Governor Deval Patrick’s recent proposed Executive Order (below), the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination will be responsible for adopting regulations “that prohibit an employer from rejecting or discharging a qualified person with a criminal record because of the mere existence of the record.”
DRAFT

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.___________

ESTABLISHING POLICIES FOR THE REINTEGRATION
OF PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL HISTORIES

WHEREAS, the Commonwealth maintains over 2.8 million criminal records, which are difficult to read, and many of which contain inaccuracies, but are, nonetheless, routinely disseminated to non-criminal justice agencies;

WHEREAS, the number of non-criminal justice agencies requesting criminal record information has grown exponentially over the last decade such that in 2006 alone, 1.4 million requests were processed, and the extent of the information received by these agencies also has expanded substantially;

WHEREAS, thousands of people processed through the criminal justice system, including those found not guilty or whose charges were not prosecuted, are unable, due to the dissemination of their records, to secure employment, job training or otherwise lead productive, taxpaying and law-abiding lives;

WHEREAS, the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in reducing its recidivism and unemployment rates, currently at 43 and 4.4 percent respectively;

WHEREAS, the criminal justice system heavily impacts minority communities resulting in higher joblessness and unemployment rates that in turn exacerbate poverty (ranging from 6 to 52 percent in Boston) and reinforce cycles of criminal system involvement;

WHEREAS, the Governor’s Taskforce on CORI Reform determined that there is widespread agreement among various stakeholders, including employers, Bar Associations and social service providers, to diminish barriers impeding successful reintegration of persons with criminal histories into mainstream living;

NOW THEREFORE, I, Deval Patrick, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by virtue of the authority vested in me as Supreme Executive Magistrate, and Lieutenant Governor Timothy P. Murray, do hereby order as follows:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy.
It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to promote the full participation of law-abiding residents, who have criminal offender record information (CORI), in the labor market and in other spheres of mainstream living.

Section 3. Directives to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

3.1 The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, (MCAD) shall adopt regulations that prohibit an employer from rejecting or discharging a qualified person with a criminal record because of the mere existence of the record.

3.2 The MCAD shall adopt regulations that prohibit the use of an erroneously issued CORI in making a hiring, promotion or firing decision.

3.3 The MCAD shall adopt regulations that require an employer making an adverse decision based on a CORI to insure that one or more convictions on the report substantially relate to a position to be filled and that the decision is objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. The MCAD regulations also shall adopt the standards set forth at the Criminal History Systems Board regulation, 803 CMR 6.11, and require that employers follow the standards.

3.4 The MCAD shall adopt regulations that afford any aggrieved person with a CORI the right to avail him or herself of the agency’s complaint mechanism.

3.5 The MCAD, under its plenary powers to combat discrimination, shall ensure, through periodic investigation and monitoring, that criminal histories are not been used as proxy for unlawful race or national origin discrimination.